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Subjects made judgments concerning the strength and direction of the contingency between two 
dichotomous variables in a situation in which no contingency actually existed. The judgments 
exhibited a significant primacy effect. The effects of warning and not warning the subjects that 
they would be required to recall the frequencies of observed event co-occurrences implied that this 
primacy effect was due to ‘attention decrement’ (Anderson 1981). According to this hypothesis, 
attention to contingency-relevant information diminishes after the subject is exposed to only a 
small portion of the available information. 
Judging the contingency between events, e.g., symptom S and disease 
D in medical diagnosis, is an important cognitive activity. The pioneer- 
ing work of Smedslund (1963) and Jenkins and Ward (1965; Ward and 
Jenkins 1965) led to the recognition that people exhibit limited pro- 
ficiency at contingency judgment tasks. Those initial studies, as well as 
subsequent research, have shed much light on the nature of contingency 
judgment processes as well as the effectiveness of those processes (see 
reviews by Beyth-Marom (1982) and Cracker (1981)). 
Suppose that events E and P are those of interest in a given 
situation. The events are contingent if I’( E 1 E;) f P( E 1 F’) or, equiv- 
alently, P( I: 1 E) f P( F 1 E’), where the primes indicate the comple- 
mentary events. The direction and strength of the contingency is 
measured by what might be called a ‘contingency index’, A = P( E I P) 
- P( E I F’). Table 1 shows a contingency table whose axes are identi- 
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fied with the variables defined by E and E’, on the one hand, and F 
and F’, on the other. The frequencies for the four possible joint events 
are denoted in the cells by lower-case letters. Assuming that observa- 
tions are selected at random, P( E 1 F) is estimated by the frequency 
ratio a/( a + c), and P( E 1 F’) by the ratio b/(b + d). Thus, a proper 
contingency judgment should be based upon a comparison of these 
ratios or, equivalently, the frequency products ad and bc. 
One reason contingency judgments are suboptimal is that people 
seem to use improper contingency rules (Arkes and Harkness 1983; 
Beyth-Marom 1982; Shaklee and Tucker 1980; Smedslund 1963). That 
is, the criteria by which people judge the relatedness of binary variables 
do not agree with the statistical convention. Rather than comparing 
u/( a + c) to b/( b + d), subjects have often appeared to judge con- 
tingency on the basis of the frequency a, the so-called ‘Cell A strategy’. 
In other words, they conclude that events E and F are contingent to 
the extent that they co-occur. Another popular rule involves contrasting 
frequency (a + d) to frequency (b + c). This ‘sum of diagonals strategy’ 
is in essence a comparison of the number of cases consistent with the 
hypothesized contingency of events E and F to the number of cases 
contradicting that contingency. 
Strategy selection and resulting contingency judgments are also af- 
fected by how the relevant data are presented (Arkes and Harkness 
1983; Shaklee and Mims 1982; Ward and Jenkins 1965). The simplest 
means by which one might judge the contingency of events E and F 
would be with the aid of a data summary, e.g., a contingency table such 
as that contained in table 1. However, in a more naturalistic situation, 
information becomes available case-by-case. Even if a person wished to 
apply an appropriate contingency judgment rule, doing so with a serial 
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presentation of cases would impose heavy demands on memory. As 
expected, contingency judgment is more accurate when based on infor- 
mation presented in summary rather than serial formats. Consistent 
with the memory demand hypothesis, the Cell A strategy seems to be 
used more commonly when the subject is confronted with large as 
compared to small numbers of cases. 
Beyth-Marom (1982) has demonstrated another factor which in- 
fluences the strategy by which relatedness is judged. Contingency 
judgment is affected by a variable’s type, or how the variable is 
described to the subject. An asymmetric binary variable is such that the 
name of the variable is closely identified with one of the events 
constituting the variable, but not the other, e.g., ‘present’ vs ‘absent’, 
when the variable is described as ‘Pigmentation’. In contrast, for 
symmetric variables, the constituent events are of equal status, e.g., 
‘dark’ vs ‘light’, again when ‘Pigmentation’ is the relevant variable. 
Subjects are more likely to use contingency rules relying on only part of 
the relevant information, e.g., the Cell A strategy, when variables are 
asymmetric rather than symmetric. 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) have argued that, in many real-world 
situations, people often lack some of the information needed to de- 
termine contingencies. Suppose, for example, that in table 1 event E is 
‘successful job performance’ and event P is ‘predicted successful job 
performance’. Employers almost never hire workers who are expected 
to perform poorly. So, frequencies b and d will be unavailable, and a 
proper contingency assessment will be impossible to achieve. 
Even if available, relevant information may have little or no effect on 
judgments of the relatedness of variables (Alloy and Tabachnik 1984; 
Jennings et al. 1982; Wright and Murphy 1984). Instead, these judg- 
ments are often dictated by people’s expectations and intuitive theories 
about how the variables ought to be related. The most dramatic 
demonstrations of such phenomena are the ‘intuitive correlations’ that 
subjects report between clinical symptoms and diagnoses in situations 
in which no contingencies actually exist (Chapman and Chapman 1967, 
1969). Moreover, as Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) have shown, when 
subjects are able to request any frequency information they desire, they 
often do not ask for all that is needed to make a legitimate contingency 
determination. Rather, they seek information that is consistent with, 
but not decisive for, their initial hypotheses about the potential con- 
tingency. 
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The purpose of the present research was to determine whether 
contingency judgments are affected by an additional factor beyond 
those implicated by previous studies. In particular, we tested the 
proposition that the effect of relevant information on a person’s con- 
tingency judgments would depend on when that information was 
presented. We hypothesized that contingency judgments would exhibit 
a primacy effect, such that information presented early would have 
greater impact than information made available later. This hypothesis 
was suggested in part by the personality impression literature. It has 
been found that impressions of target persons typically are more 
strongly affected by trait descriptors shown early rather than late in a 
presentation sequence (Anderson and Barrios 1961; Hendrick and 
Costantini 1970). In effect, we hypothesized that primacy effects in 
personality impression formation are only one manifestation of more 
.general judgmental mechanisms. 
The reported experiment also tested a proposed explanation for the 
anticipated primacy effect. Anderson (1981) has reviewed evidence 
indicating that primac.y effects in impression formation are often due to 
‘attention decrement’. After viewing initial data relevant to whether a 
target person should be liked or disliked, subjects tend to stop paying 
attention to the incoming data. Thus, the impression of the target 
person will necessarily be more strongly influenced by the target’s traits 
that happen to be presented early rather than late. Exactly why atten- 
tion diminishes over time is unclear. A plausible account for the 
phenomenon is that human judgment processes operate according to 
subjective sampling principles. These principles determine how gener- 
alizations about populations should be inferred from samples drawn 
from those populations. Formal statistical sampling practice relies upon 
various forms of the law of large numbers. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1971) have shown that subjective judgments seem to follow a ‘law of 
small numbers’. If so, then subjects could be expected to stop paying 
attention to contingency-relevant information quite rapidly, since such 
effortful attention will be seen as unnecessary for the formation of 
reasonable judgments. 
Our approach to the issues was similar to that taken by Anderson 
and Hubert (1963) in their study of primacy effects in impression 
formation. The strategy required that different groups of subjects be 
shown sequences of data that, overall, implied that the relevant events 
were unrelated. However, the order of cases contained in each sequence 
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was such that cases presented early in the sequence indicated a con- 
tingency in one direction; cases presented toward the end of the 
sequence supported a contingency in the opposite direction. In this 
way, a primacy effect could be identified. Also, all subjects were 
required to recall the frequencies of case types they observed. However, 
only half the subjects were forewarned of the recall test; the others were 
not. If the attention decrement hypothesis had credence, then the 
anticipated primacy effect in contingency judgments should have been 
weaker for the forewarned subjects. 
Method 
Subjects 
There were 129 paid subjects in the study. They were assigned randomly to the four 
conditions of the experiment described below. 
Stimuli 
The subjects were asked to consider a hypothetical plant called the ‘Rhododipsia’. 
Rhododipsia were reported to grow in both Region A and Region B. Rhododipsia were 
also said to come in either of two colors, light or dark. During the experiment, subjects 
were shown what were purported to be the results of a random sampling of Rhodo- 
dipsia from Regions A and B. Each observation was displayed on a slide indicating the 
specimen’s region and whether it was light or dark. 
Procedure 
The subjects’ task was to determine whether and to what extent Rhododipsia region 
and color were related to each other. They were informed that the basis for their 
judgments would be the results of a random sampling of Rhododipsia specimens. The 
subjects, who served in non-interacting groups of three to five individuals, were then 
shown practice slides illustrating all four types of specimens that might be observed. 
The subjects were requested to pay close attention to the slides they would see, but to 
not keep written records. At the end of the experiment, the subjects were asked to recall 
how many Rhododipsia from each region and of each color they had been shown. Half 
the subjects were forewarned of this recall test, while the remaining subjects were not. 
Fig. la is a contingency table describing the distribution of Rhododipsia shown to 
the subjects. As is apparent, over the entire sequence of Rhododipsia slides, there was 
no contingency between region and color. The complete slide sequence actually 
consisted of two blocks of slides. Fig. lb shows the distribution of Rhododipsia,types 
contained in Block 1, which implies a contingency whereby light-colored plants tended 
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Fig. 1. Distributions of fictitious Rhododipsia plants according to region and color$a) overall, (b) 
Block 1, (c) Block 2. 
to be relatively more common in Region A. The distribution of Rhododipsia types 
contained in Block 2 is shown in fig. lc. The contingency evident in Block 2 was exactly 
opposite in direction and strength to that indicated in Block 1. The presentation 
sequence of slides in Block 1 was random. The slide sequence in Block 2 was 
isomorphic to the Block 1 sequence. Using letters corresponding to the cells shown in 
table 1, the transformation was: A + B, B + A, C --j D, D -+ C. That is, an observation 
belonging to Cell A was replaced by one belonging to Cell B, one belonging to Cell B 
was replaced by one belonging to Cell A, and so on. Half the subjects saw the slides in 
the order Block l-Block 2; the others were exposed to the slides in the opposite order. 
The design of the experiment was thus a 2 X 2 factorial. The first factor was whether 
or not the subject was forewarned of the impending recall test. The second was defined 
by the order of slide blocks. 
After being shown all the specimen slides, each displayed for 4 set, subjects reported 
their judgments in written form. Inferred contingency judgments were derived from 
responses to two conditional probability questions. The subject was asked: ‘Suppose a 
Rhododipsia plant is from Region A. What is the chance that it is Light in color rather 
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than Dark?’ The subject was told that he or she should report 100% ‘if you are 
absolutely sure the plant would be Light’, and 0% ‘if you are absolutely sure the plant 
would NOT be Light’. Similar instructions defined the meaning of 50% and other 
intermediate responses. A parallel question requested the subject’s judgment of the 
chance that a plant would be light if it had been found in Region B. 
Subjects were also asked to indicate how strongly related, if at all, they felt that 
Rhododipsia region and color were. They did so on a 0 to 6 scale, on which 0 meant 
that ‘the two features are completely UNRELATED to each other’, while 6 implied 
that ‘they are PERFECTLY related to each other’. When the rating was anything other 
than 0, the subject also reported the direction of the perceived relationship. 
The memory task was the final one performed by the subjects. Each individual 
completed a contingency table by entering the numbers of plants of each type recalled 
to have been shown in the slides. 
Results and Discussion 
For each subject, the following inferred judged contingency index 
was derived: A’ = P’ (Light 1 Region A) - P’ (Light 1 Region B), where 
P’ indicates a judged rather than an ‘objective’ probability. Fig. 2 
displays the mean value of A’, as a function of slide presentation order 
and recall test warning. 
An analysis of variance concerning A’ was performed on differences 
in P’ (Light 1 Region A) and P’ (Light 1 Region B) after these probabil- 
ity judgments were subjected to appropriate variance-stabilizing arcsine 
transformations. As hypothesized, when subjects were not forewarned 
of the recall test, a primacy effect was evident. The mean of A’ was 
significantly higher when the block of slides containing a Light-A 
contingency was presented first rather than second (J’(1, 125) = 14.78, 
p < 0.001). As expected, according to the attention decrement proposi- 
tion, there was not a significant primacy effect in the judgments of 
subjects who were forewarned of the recall test (F(1, 125) = 1.12, ns); 
the interaction of the warning and order factors was marginally signifi- 
cant (F(1, 125) = 3.76, p -c 0.06). 
The mean relatedness ratings of subjects in Warning and No-Warn- 
ing conditions were 2.19 and 2.42, respectively. Although this difference 
is consistent with expectations, it is not statistically reliable (I: < 1). 
The fact that subjects’ explicit relatedness judgments do not agree with 
the judgments inferred from their conditional probability assessments is 
compatible with previous results (cf. Beyth-Marom 1982). Those studies 
imply that, although subjects have the capacity to report proper con- 







5 0.00 - 
s 
-0.05- 
o Warning ------- 
l No Warning 
‘. 
I I 
Light-A First Light-A Second 
PRESENTATION ORDER 
Fig. 2. Mean inferred judged contingency index, A’ = P’ (Light 1 Region A)- P’ (Light 1 Region B), 
as a function of presentation order and recall test warning. 
tingency judgments, they fail to do so because their subjective notions 
of relatedness often disagree with the accepted statistical concept. 
The accuracy of subjects’ recollections of the frequencies of slides 
showing Rhododipsia of various origins and colors were indexed by the 
following score: 
S=CIf’-71, 
where f’ represents the estimated frequency reported by the subject for 
each cell in the Rhododipsia region-color contingency table, and the 
summation is over all cells. The mean of S was 6.31 for subjects in the 
Warning conditions, and 7.52 for those in the No-Warning conditions. 
The observed difference is in the expected direction, but not statistically 
significant. It might also be noted that the subjects were generally quite 
accurate in estimating the total number of slides they saw. The mean 
sum of f’ was 28.05 in the Warning conditions, and 27.32 in the 
No-Warning conditions. These means did not differ significantly from 
28, the actual total number of slides, or from each other. 
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Over the entire sample of specimens shown to each subject, Rhodo- 
dipsia color and region were completely unrelated. However, if the 
subject only considered the first half of the sample, that subsample 
would in fact support a color-region contingency. So a legitimate 
question to ask is whether, after seeing the first half of the sample, it 
was appropriate for the subject to have decided that a contingency 
existed, and therefore stop paying attention to additional sample infor- 
mation. To gain some sense of the reasonableness of such an action, the 
contingency of Rhododipsia region and color, based on either of the 
single-block distributions shown in figs. lb and lc, was tested according 
to standard statistical procedures. The resulting (corrected)x2 statistic 
was 1.14, which is far from conventionally acceptable levels of statisti- 
cal significance. That is, a contingency judgment based on only the first 
half of the available information would seem to be a hasty judgment. 
In summary, it does indeed appear that contingency judgments are 
subject to primacy effects. The present data also imply that these 
primacy effects are due to attention decrement; the ‘law of small 
numbers’ reaches into yet another quarter. Besides being of interest in 
themselves, these conclusions offer initial hypotheses for why other 
puzzling phenomena occur. 
Investigators have been struck by the lack of agreement in the 
judgment policies of different people - including experts - operating in 
the same domains. For example, Hoffman et al. ,(1968) studied how 
nine gastroenterologists made ulcer malignancy judgments on the basis 
of seven cues discernible from X-rays, e.g., ulcer contour and the 
presence of related ulcers. These specialists differed markedly in their 
reliance upon the various indicators. The observed policy differences 
seemed to be a major cause for the low interjudge agreement; the 
median correlation between the diagnoses of pairs of physicians was 
only 0.38. It is conceivable that the types of primacy effects observed in 
the present study contribute to such policy differences. Natural sam- 
pling mechanisms imply that small samples of cases can differ from one 
another substantially with respect to the contingencies between ulcer 
characteristics and their malignancies. When neophyte physicians begin 
learning to diagnose malignancy, the present results suggest that they 
might be overly (and permanently) influenced by the chance con- 
tingencies observed in the first few cases they consider. A plethora of 
divergent judgment policies would result. 
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